1995 Folsom Dam Gate Failure In 1995, Folsom Dam encountered a major gate failure, causing thousands of gallons to pour out of the dam before they could fix it. "Dam failure including those with severe social consequences occure all the same. 22 people died and losses exceeded 40 billion rubles as a result of the Tirlyan Dam failed. Of the 6291 high concrete dam on the World Register as of 1995, 0.24% failed, 4.3% experienced damages & the remaining dams functioned. The 0.24% that failed & consequential there was numerous victims & large material losses play a role in the current notions about the behaviour of concrete dams" Lessons from Failures of Concrete Dams on Rock Foundations E.S Kalustyan Hydrolotechinical Constructions, Vol 29, No. 2 1995. Dam Failures HYDROCOOP is a non profit Association of international experts for dams spillways, flood mitigations and sedimentation management. Hydrocoop promotes information dissemination, promote and improve communication channels between countries. "When planning a new dam or improving an existing one, it is important to examine the effects of recorded or potential failures before selecting the dam type, the safest design details, the best reservoir operating rules and associated warning systems. Yet such information is still inadequately disseminated Hydroocoop website". This extract from the Hydrocoop paper addresses risks- and more particularly all human risks -associated with the construction, operation, and failure of dams, excluding indirect environmental or resettlement problems. The study is mainly based on analysis of the circumstances, causes and consequences of past accidents, and on analysis of the measures which could have avoided those accidents or reduced their gravity. Its purpose is to identify the main real risks associated with each type and height of dam, for all circumstances (construction, first filling, floods, etc.). It may be of help for several aspects:   in extensive risk analysis of very large dams-for reliably substantiating the probabilities chosen in event trees; for identifying possibilities for reducing these risks through low-cost structural or non-structural measures For the complete paper please refer to http://www.hydrocoop.org/rsmwhatsort2.htm For images of 1972 Dam Failure that occured in Rapid City please refer to http://sd.water.usgs.gov/projects/1972flood/photos.html 14 December 2005 Taum Sauk Dam Failure http://www.crh.noaa.gov/lsx/?n=taumsaukdamfailure The World Commission on Dams (WCD) found the following facts: Only 50% (n=99) of the sample constructions were completed on-time. Project budgets on average blew out by up to 56% (n=80). 70% of dams built for water storage purposes fail to supply water as targeted. It was found that the less the area of a reservoir the higher the possibility it would successfully reach the target of water supply. This indicates that dams built for this purpose are often build excessively and wastefully. 60% of mitigation efforts made to deal with the impact of dams are futile and downstream damage continues to occur. 70% of agreements made related to the local people’s life do not involve the local community concerned. The World Commission on Dams http://www.dams.org/